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THE CHILLING EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS ON THE USE OF THE
INTERNET BY MUSLIM-AMERICANS
DAWINDER S. SIDHU*
I. INTRODUCTION
Al-Qaeda used the Internet to covertly plan and execute the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and each of its subsequent
terrorist plots. As the Internet became a vital tool for Muslim
extremists, it also became a target of government surveillance
measures. In particular, the government developed and utilized several
programs to monitor Internet usage and gather relevant electronic
evidence about terrorist threats.
Some have suggested that Muslims in the United States have
modified aspects of their daily lives to avoid harassment or suspicion.
Following 9/11, members of leading Arab and Muslim advocacy
organizations informally reported that some U.S. Muslim-Americans
are reluctant to use the Internet because they fear that their Internet use
is or will be monitored by government officials. These Muslim-
Americans fear that the U.S. government will take adverse actions
against them, including reviewing their immigration status or placing
them on "no-fly" lists. Indeed, one staff attorney said that some
Muslim-Americans are so concerned about government surveillance
that they resist the use of everyday forms of technology, including
telephones.'
However, the effect of government surveillance measures on
the use of Internet technology has not been formally or scientifically
addressed. To fill this void, a survey of Muslim-Americans was
commissioned to determine if and to what extent Muslims in the
United States, concerned that the government may track their online
movements, have changed their use of the Internet after 9/11. The
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survey was conducted in conjunction with The University of
Oklahoma's Public Opinion Learning Laboratory (OUPOLL).2 This
article presents the survey's results, which indicate that an
overwhelming majority of polled Muslim-Americans believe that the
U.S. government monitors their post-9/11 Internet activities, although
only a limited segment of the Muslim-American population has
changed its online behavior. This article statistically confirms what is
known anecdotally-that Muslim-Americans not only believe the
government monitors their routine activities, but that such concerns
have translated into actual changes in daily behavior.
This article demonstrates that the effect of the post-9/l1
climate facing Muslim-Americans pervades even ordinary aspects of
contemporary life. Part II of the article discusses the legal paradigm of
when discrimination has legal implications and merits government
action. Part III explores al-Qaeda's sophisticated use of the Internet
and summarizes the government's post-9/l1 online surveillance
efforts. Part IV discusses OUPOLL's survey results.
I readily acknowledge that this article is of limited focus.
While it addresses only a single human consequence of the post-9/11
environment in the United States, I hope that this article will become
part of a broader effort to understand the pernicious effects the post-
9/11 climate environment has on Muslims and those perceived to be
Muslim. Such understanding guards against the alienation and
isolation of Muslims in America, which is critically important for the
nation's security. 3 Finally, it is important to note that the article does
not examine the legality, efficacy, or propriety of any government
2. The term "chilling effect" in this article describes when individuals otherwise
interested in engaging in a lawful activity are deterred from doing so in light of perceived or
actual government regulation of that activity. See Gayle Horn, Online Searches and Offline
Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and the New FBI Guidelines, 60 N.Y.U. ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 735, 749 (2005) (describing two different "types of chilling effects").
3. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 958 (2002) ("If authorities
have reason to believe that there might be potential terrorists lurking in the Arab immigrant
community, they would do better to work with the millions of law-abiding members of that
community to obtain their assistance in identifying potential threats, than to alienate the
community by treating many of its members as suspect because of their ethnicity or national
origin and pursuing others under conditions of secrecy that invite fear and paranoia.");
Montgomery E. Engel, Note, Donating "Blood Money": Fundraising for International
Terrorism by United States Charities and the Government's Efforts to Constrict the Flow, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 251, 286 (2004) ("By marginalizing and alienating Muslim-
Americans the government runs the risk of encouraging the kind of anger, resentment, and
resultant extremism that Americans have been victims of, at home, in the Arab world, and
elsewhere.").
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surveillance programs.4 Moreover, to the extent that this article
establishes the chilling effect on the use of the Internet by Muslim-
Americans, the article does not argue that the chilling effect itself may
serve as part of a constitutional challenge to those measures. 5 This
article aims to enrich our understanding of the potential impact of
government measures on Muslims in the United States, and more
specifically, of the delicate state of pluralism in times of war.
II. THE LEGAL PARADIGM
Over fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial
6discrimination in public accommodations, was a proper exercise of
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.7 The Court noted that discrimination against African-
Americans by hotels had "a qualitative as well as quantitative effect
on interstate travel by Negroes." 8 The Court said that the qualitative
effect "was the obvious impairment of the Negro traveler's pleasure
and convenience that resulted when he continually was uncertain of
finding lodging." 9 As for the quantitative effect, the Court observed
4. The concern regarding the legality of such programs has been discussed elsewhere.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Joyce & Andrew E. Bigart, Liability for All, Privacy for None: The
Conundrum of Protecting Privacy Rights in a Pervasively Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1481, 1482 (2007) (noting that "without clear legal limits, the government has begun to
expand its electronic surveillance operations to a degree not contemplated by the original laws
or supported by the majority of U.S. citizens"); Peter Murphy, Note, An Examination of the
United States Department of Justice's Attempt to Conduct Warantless Monitoring of
Computer Networks Through the Consent Exception to the Wiretap Act, 34 CoNN. L. REV.
1317, 1351 (2002) ("The ability of the Justice Department to conduct warrantless monitoring
of computer network users through the consent exception to Title III would significantly
reduce the privacy protections for communications our system has developed over the past
forty years.").
5. See Horn, supra note 2, at 737 (arguing that "the existence of a legally cognizable
chilling effect created by the grant of online investigative tools in the new Guidelines is
doubtful") (emphasis added).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
7. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U. S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see also Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298 (1964) (characterizing the "basic holding" of Heart of Atlanta as
finding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be "a valid exercise of the power to regulate
interstate commerce insofar as it requires hotels and motels to serve transients without regard
to their race or color").
8. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253 (emphases added); see also Jil L. Martin,
Note, United States v. Morrison: Federalism Against the Will of the States, 32 LoY. U. CHt.
L.J. 243, 268-69 (2000) ("These combined effects on interstate commerce were found to be
sufficient to enable Congress to regulate the conduct of such purely local activities.").
9. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253.
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that "there was evidence that this uncertainty stemming from racial
discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a
substantial portion of the Negro community."
' r
This seminal ruling placed legal importance on the qualitative
and quantitative effects on minorities subject to discrimination in
ostensibly everyday circumstances. The ruling also recognized the
ability of the legislature to address the qualitative and quantitative
effects of discrimination. Moreover, the Court focused not only on the
act of excluding African-Americans from places of accommodation,
but the experiences of African-Americans in enduring such exclusion,
for instance "having to travel great distances to secure" lodging, or
"hav[ing] ... to call upon friends to put them up overnight" when
accommodations were unavailable to them."
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Muslim-, Arab-, Sikh-, and
South Asian-Americans have been the recipients of a severe and
persistent backlash. In the first week following the attacks, 645 bias
crimes were directed at those perceived to be Middle Eastern.' 2 In the
first eight weeks after 9/11, over a thousand bias incidents were
reported, includin3 up to nineteen murders, assaults, harassment, and
acts of vandalism. 3 The violence is ongoing. In 2006, for example, a
turbaned Sikh in California was stabbed in the neck with a steak knife
because, in the words of the local prosecutor, the perpetrator "wanted
to seek revenge for Sept. 11 and attack a member of the Taliban.'
14
Reports on the post-9/11 backlash against certain ethnic groups
almost exclusively focus on hate crimes and other tangible acts of
discrimination. It is understandable that the discussion to combat the
post-9/l1 backlash focuses on tangible actions-as they are more
easily reported, verified, and conveyed. Moreover, authorities, such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are charged with the responsibility
to address legally cognizable discrimination, such as an assault or act
of vandalism. It is beyond question that tangible acts of violence and
discrimination deserve the attention of policymakers, the law
enforcement community, and the public.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 252-53.
12. S. ASIAN AM. LEADERS OF TOMORROW, AMERICAN BACKLASH: TERRORISTS BRING
WAR HOME IN MORE WAYS THAN ONE 3 (2001), available at http://old.91 ldigitalarchive.org/
documents/BiasReport.pdf
13. Muneer 1. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as
Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1259, 1261-62 (2004).
14. John Cotd, Hate Crime Alleged in Stabbing of Sikh; Santa Clara Suspect Could
Face Life Term 1fHe Is Convicted, S. F. CHRON., Aug. 2, 2006, at BI0.
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However, a lesson of Heart of Atlanta Motel is applicable post-
9/11: the experiences of the affected minority groups need not rise to
the level of a hate crime or punishable act to warrant the public's
consideration or a response from the legislature. That is, the human
consequences of discrimination can have legal implications and merit
governmental action. For example, the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel
addressed the act of hotels refusing to lodge African-Americans as
well as the fact that African-Americans were discouraged from
traveling due to such experiences. 15 Similarly, in the aftermath of 9/11
it is vital to examine not only instances where a turbaned Sikh has
been ejected from an airplane on account of his perceived race or
religion, but also where Sikh-Americans have "stopped flying
altogether in the months and, in some cases, years after 9/11 to avoid
potential problems."'
16
Accordingly, to the extent that the experiences of African-
Americans during the civil rights era provoked social concern, led to
congressional remedy, and earned judicial notice, the experiences of
Muslim-, Arab-, Sikh-, and South Asian-Americans should similarly
trouble those interested in ensuring that all Americans are treated with
equality, dignity, and without regard to their race, religion, or national
origin. 7 Indeed, the post-9/1 1 backlash against Muslims and those
perceived to be Muslim has received some press coverage.' 8 For
example, in 2006 the San Francisco Chronicle reported that a Muslim
woman, who "removes the ho'ab, as the head scarf is commonly
referred to, when she goes to job interviews or has to fly[,] ... was
frustrated by repeated airport security interrogations[.]"' 9 In addition,
in 2007 a Sikh advocacy organization studied the harassment of Sikh
students in New York City Public Schools and found, among other
things, that some Sikh students cut their hair-though Sikhs are
15. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253.
16. JUNE HAN, DISCRIMINATION AND NAT'L SEC. INITIATIVE, WE ARE AMERICANS Too: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON SOUTH ASIAN COMMUNITIES 20 (Sept. 2006),
available at http://www.geocities.com/dnsinitiative/91 1_Report.pdf.
17. See Thomas Ross, Whiteness after 9/11, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 223, 237 (2005)
(remarking that "Flying While Brown" has "displaced its predecessor, 'Driving While
Black"').
18. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY
MAINSTREAM 35 -39 (May 22, 2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-
americans.pdf (addressing the worries of Muslims in America, including concerns "about
government surveillance, job discrimination, and being harassed in public").
19. Matthai Chakko Kuruvila, 9/11: Five years later: Typecasting Muslims as a Race,
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 2006, at Al.
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• 20required by their faith to keep their hair unshorn -m response to
physical harassment. 21 Again, the value of these accounts is that they
illuminate the human consequences of discriminatory treatment.
III. TERRORISM AND THE INTERNET
A. The Jihad Online
There is ample evidence that the al-Qaeda regime responsible
for the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has diligently and deftly used the
Internet to further its nefarious agenda. 22 Numerous academic and
press sources have detailed al-Qaeda's longstanding and continuing
relationship with the Internet.
23
Al-Qaeda has utilized the power of the Internet for many years.
Indeed, "[b]y the late 1990's, al-Qaeda's use of the Internet was well
20. See KHUSHWANT SINGH, A HISTORY OF THE SIKHS 84 (1978) (listing the five Sikh
articles of faith, which include unshorn hair); see also Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884
(9th Cir. 1995).
21. SIKH COALITION, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON BIAS
AGAINST SIKH STUDENTS IN NEW YORK CITY'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5 (June 2007), available at
http://www.sikhcoalition.org/advisories/documents/HatredintheHallwaysFinal.pdf. According
to the report, one Sikh student noted, "I used to have a turban. I used to get into fights, and
then I cut my hair." Id.
22. See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire: Assessing the
Constitutionality of the National Security Agency's Warrantless Wiretapping Program: Exit
the Rule of Law, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429, 433 n.26 (2006) (noting that "it is now
widely known that al-Qaeda operatives used (and likely continue to use) Internet chat rooms
and free, anonymous e-mail accounts to communicate").
23. See, e.g., Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing
Terrorist Use of the Internet, 5 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2004); Aaron Nance, Note,
Taking the Fear out of Electronic Surveillance in the New Age of Terror, 70 UMKC L. REV.
751(2002); Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: An
Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1 (2002); ROHAN
GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR (2002); Kasie Hunt, Osama
bin Laden Fan Clubs Build Online Communities, USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 2006, at A04; Ronald
Marks, Opinion, Homeland Security's Biggest Challenge: Too Much Information, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 21, 2005, at 9; Andrew Higgins, Uploading Terror: How al Qaeda Put
Internet in Service of Global Jihad, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2002, at A1; James Risen & David
Johnston, Traces of Terror: The Intelligence Reports; Agency Is Under Scrutiny For
Overlooked Messages, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at A20; David S. Fallis & Ariana Eunjung
Cha, Agents Following Suspects' Lengthy Electronic Trail; Web of Connections Used to Plan
Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at A24; see also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, JIHAD
ONLINE: ISLAMIC TERRORISTS AND THE INTERNET (2002), available at
http://www.adl.org/Leam/intemet/jihad-online.pdf, [hereinafter ADL REPORT].
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underway in regard to theological and paramilitary training. '' 24 An
insightful report on al-Qaeda and the Internet noted that "[a]l-Qaeda
operatives relied heavily on the Internet for help in planning and
coordinating the September 11 attacks." 25 The 9/11 Commission
Report stated that in "the final days" before 9/11, Mohammad Atta, a
9/11 hijacker, and a key al-Qaeda operative used technology to keep in
contact. 26 Aside from 9/11, it is well-established that other terrorist
plots have involved extensive use of the Internet.
27
Al-Qaeda uses the Internet for several purposes, including to
train and recruit adherents, reestablish damaged cells, obtain financing,
and communicate operational information.28  Al-Qaeda has
transformed the Internet into a "virtual training ground," using the
Internet to instruct its members about the "cleaning and care of
weapons, physical training for its foot soldiers, and the way to set up a
,, - . 29
safe house, as well as how to stage a kidnapping," among other tasks.
24. Michael Scheuer, Assessing London and Sharm al-Sheikh: The Role of Internet
Intelligence and Urban Warfare Training (Jamestown Found. Terrorism Focus), Aug. 5, 2005,
at 7, available at http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/tf 002 015.pdf.
25. ADL REPORT, supra note 23, at 9 (emphasis added); see also Nance, supra note 23,
at 755 ("[T]he al-Qaeda cells behind the Twin Towers and Pentagon attacks used the Internet,
email and cell phones to communicate about their plans.").
26. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 248-49 (2004).
27. See, e.g., Andrew Becker, Technology and Terror: The New Modus Operandi, PBS
Frontline, Jan. 25, 2005, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/
special/tech.html ("Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center
attack, used encryption from his base in the Philippines in the mid-1990s when he plotted to
blow up 11 U.S. airplanes over the Pacific."); Nathan E. Carrell, Note, Spying on the Mob:
United States v. Scarfo-A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 193, 195
n. 17 (2002) ("Suspected shoe-bomber Richard Reid left data on his laptop connecting him to
Al Qaeda and sent e-mails from Internet cafes.").
28. Hinnen, supra note 23, at 1 ("It has become increasingly clear that terrorist
organizations avail themselves of the opportunities afforded by the Internet to recruit and train
adherents and foot soldiers, to raise and move funds, and to plan and execute attacks.").
29. CNN Live Saturday (CNN television broadcast July 17, 2004), transcript available
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0407/17/cst.03.html; see also Steve Coil &
Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations, WASH. POST., Aug. 7,
2005, at A01 ("With laptops and DVDs... jihadists have sought to replicate the training...
facilities they lost in Afghanistan with countless new locations on the Internet."); Jessica
Stem, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at 34 ("Islamist Web sites also
offer on-line training courses in the production of explosives and urge visitors to take action
on their own."); Jarret M. Brachman, High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda's Use of New Technology,
30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 149, 153 (2006) (commenting on al-Qaeda's "virtual combat
classrooms"); Benjamin R. Davis, Comment, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating Terrorist
Exploitation of the Internet with the Rule of Law and Improved Tools for Cyber Governance,
15 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 119, 149 (2006) ("In late 2003, a Web site entitled 'Al Qa'ida
University for Jihad Sciences' offered an online instruction manual for various terrorist attacks
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For example, the perpetrators of the July 7, 2005, London and July 23,
2005, Egypt attacks "may well have profited fr[o]m the urban-warfare
training al-Qaeda has made readily available on the Internet,"
according to the former Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Central
Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorist Center.
30
AI-Qaeda's message can reach anyone in the digital world and
thus can serve as a powerful recruitment aid.31 The Director of
Research at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States
Military Academy observed that "by leveraging new information and
communication technologies, al-Qaeda has transformed itself into an
organic social movement, making its virulent ideology accessible to
anyone with a computer." 32 The Director further explained that "al-
Qaeda's use of the Internet... has.., enabled it to radicalize and
empower armies of new recruits by shaping their general
worldview."
33
Similarly, the Internet has a restorative function for al-Qaeda.
Following the American military campaign in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda
"used the Internet to replace their dismantled training camps,
reconnect their weakened organization, and reconstitute their
leadership." 34 A senior security analyst noted that the distribution of
al-Qaeda material over the Internet has, to a certain degree,
"compensated for the loss of Afghanistan as a major training arena in
both the ideological and tactical senses. 3 5 A commentator observed
that al-Qaeda Web sites are "central to al-Qaida's strategy to ensure
that its war with the US will continue even if many of its cells across
the world are broken up and its current leaders are killed or
captured.,36 Accordingly, the commentator noted al-Qaeda Web sites
including 'suicide operations."') (citing ILAN BERMAN, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL,
EURASIA SECURITY WATCH No. 7 (2003)).
30. Scheuer, supra note 24, at 8.
31. See ADL REPORT, supra note 23, at 3 ("Accessible from almost anywhere on the
planet and easily used to transmit thousands of pages of propaganda, the Internet helps
Islamist terrorists unify and motivate their zealous adherents.").
32. Brachman, supra note 29, at 149.
33. Id. at 150.
34. Id. at 153.
35. Stephen Ulph, A Guide to Jihad on the Web, TERRORISM FOCUS, Mar. 31, 2005,
available at http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=236953 1; see also John
F. Murphy, Brave New World: U.S. Responses to the Rise in International Crime-An
Overview, 50 VILL. L. REv. 375, 379 (2005) ("[lt may be that the United States and coalition
forces' invasion of Afghanistan, which caused the dispersal of Al Qaeda forces, led to greater
use of the Internet by Islamic fundamentalist forces.").
36. Clive Walker, Cyber-Terrorism: Legal Principle and Law in the United Kingdom,
110 PENN ST. L. REv. 625, 637-38 (2006) (quoting Paul Eedle, Terrorism.com: How Does Al-
Qaida Stay Organized When its Members are in Hiding and Scattered Across the World?,
[VOL. 7:2
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would serve to "deepen and broaden worldwide Muslim support,
allowing al-Qaida or successor organisations to fish for recruits,
money and political backing.,
37
Al-Qaeda also uses the Internet to raise money. In 2004, an
attorney with the United States Department of Justice's Computer
Crime & Intellectual Property Section identified that al-Qaeda raises
funds online, in part by soliciting donations "directly via websites, chat
groups, and targeted electronic mailings," soliciting funds from
charitable organizations "with the express purpose of clothing,
feeding, and educating a population, but with the covert intent of
exploiting contributors' largesse to fund acts of violence," and
"perpetrat[ing] online crimes such as identity and credit card theft,
intellectual property piracy, and fraud, and support[ing] their mission
with the proceeds of such crimes[.] 3 8 As an example of the latter
category, a British investigation found that an al-Qaeda cell "used
stolen credit card numbers at hundreds of online stores to buy items
that fellow jihadists might need in the field. Authorities also say the
men laundered money from stolen credit card accounts through more
than a dozen online gambling sites," 39 which could then finance al-
Qaeda's mission.
Furthermore, the Internet allows al-Qaeda to transmit
information about its terrorist operations.4 0 Al-Qaeda has used the
Internet to select targets, sometimes by "prob[ing] vulnerabilities in
the U.S. and elsewhere. 4 1 Al-Qaeda has also used the Internet to
provide additional instructions in the execution of terrorist attacks,
including the 2004 blasts in Egypt's Sinau Peninsula.42
Al-Qaeda not only developed the Internet into a valuable tool,
but also conceived of creative ways to avert surveillance. For example,
al-Qaeda reportedly uses e-mail to communicate without actually
sending the drafted messages, thus reducing the possibility of the
GUARDIAN, July 17, 2002, at 4); see also A World Wide Web of Terror, ECONOMIST, July 14,
2007, at 36 (noting that the Internet "enabl[ed] al-Qaeda to reconstitute itself after the fall of
the Taliban and its eviction from Afghanistan").
37. Walker, supra note 36, at 638.
38. Hinnen, supra note 23, at 9.
39. Brian Krebs, Three Worked the Web to Help Terrorists: British Case Reveals How
Stolen Credit Card Data Bought Supplies for Operations, WASH. POST, July 6, 2007, at DO 1.
40. See Brachman, supra note 29, at 154 ("A1-Qaeda has increasingly looked to the
Internet as a way of shaping military operations on the battlefield."); Davis, supra note 29, at
150 ("[C]ertain instructional documents illustrate a nexus between online extremist
communications and subsequent terrorist operations.").
41. James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act-Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521, 531 (2003).
42. Davis, supra note 29, at 150.
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messages' interception. Members allegedly log into a designated e-
mail account, draft messages to each other, and save those messages to
the account without sending them, thereby avoiding an electronic
communication trail.43  Khalid Sheik Mohammed, an al-Qaeda
operative and "key planner" of 9/11, is said to have employed this
strategy:44
Mohammed or his operatives would open an account on
a free, public e-mail service such as Hotmail, write a
message in draft form, save it as a draft, then transmit
the e-mail account name and password during chatter
on a relatively secure message board[.] The intended
recipient could then open the e-mail account and read
the draft-since no e-mail message was sent, there was
a reduced risk of interception, the researchers said.45
When al-Qaeda actually sends e-mails, it allegedly uses
encryption technology or passwords to ensure that only specified
recipients can read the messages. 4a Moreover, if an e-mail is
intercepted, it is difficult to track down its author.47 For example, to
43. See Renwick McLean, Madrid Suspects Tied to E-mail Ruse; Using a Simple Trick
to Avoid Detection, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 28, 2006, at 1 ("Instead of sending the
messages, the suspect... saved them as drafts on accounts he shared with other radicals ....
They all knew the password and so they could access the accounts to read his comments and
post replies .... The ruse meant that there was no digital trail that the authorities could easily
trace, according to the judge and government. Had the messages been e-mailed, the
government might have monitored them, as is common across Europe.").
44. Coil & Glasser, supra note 29, at AO1.
45. Id.
46. See ADL REPORT, supra note 23, at 4 ("In planning the September 11 attacks, Al-
Qaeda members sent each other thousands of messages in a password-protected section of an
extreme Islamic Web site .... It is easy for terrorists to access and use the Internet
anonymously, and by using encryption programs, it is simple for them to encode the messages
they send to each other."); Posting of Evan Kohlmann to Al Qaeda and the Internet,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/discussion/2005/08/05/D12005080501262.html (Aug. 8, 2005, 15:00 EST)
("There are numerous mailing lists, chat rooms, and sympathizer web sites that immediately
advertise the new locations to AI-Qaida supporters. Increasingly, these forums are being
password protected and carefully vetted so that only apparently-genuine terrorist sympathizers
get advance notice of new releases on the Internet.").
47. See Phillip Carter, Al Qaeda and the Advent of Multinational Terrorism: Why
"Material Support" Prosecutions Are Key in the War on Terrorism, FfNDLAW, Mar. 12, 2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/student/20030312_carter.html ("With easily available encryption
and spoofing (electronic concealment of Internet addresses) techniques, Al Qaeda operatives
can send encrypted e-mail from hidden locations on the Internet to and from their commanders
in the Middle East. Even with sophisticated Internet surveillance systems such as Carnivore,
U.S. authorities have little hope of sorting through the vast amounts of e-mail sent every day,
[VOL. 7:2
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protect the identity of an e-mail account holder, Hotmail "does not use
a traceable IP address (which can be achieved by using an Internet
terminal in a public library, Internet caf6, or shopping mall), and does
not download information to a traceable storage mechanism like a
hard-disk or floppy disk.1
4 8
Surprisingly, those behind the distribution of online terrorist
materials may not be al-Qaeda members at all. A terrorism analyst
noted that al-Qaeda outsources some of its technology needs to
Internet savvy individuals willing to volunteer their time and abilities
to al-Qaeda. 49 In other words, "[w]hat [Abu Musab al-] Zarqawi is
unable to do on the Internet, [an unaffiliated and particularly able
computer specialist] does for him." 50 Moreover, the Web sites that
these individuals create are shuffled around the Internet, "sometimes
several times a day," to avoid penetration by government
counterterrorism officials and others.5'
In addition to enabling al-Qaeda to covertly conduct
operations, the Internet is also a potential target of al-Qaeda's terrorist
activity. As the Washington Post noted in 2002, "[u]nsettling signs of
al Qaeda's aims and skills in cyberspace have led some government
experts to conclude that terrorists are at the threshold of using the
Internet as a direct instrument of bloodshed., 52 In particular, al-Qaeda
may use the Internet to corrupt computer networks and thus disrupt the
government and business entities, such as railways and basic utilities,
that rely on the smooth operation of those networks.53 Service
to find the few notes sent by terrorists."); Douglas Farah & Peter Finn, Terrorism, Inc.; Al
Qaeda Franchises Brand of Violence to Groups Across World, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2003, at
A33 ("[All Qaeda members have taught individuals from other groups how to use the Internet
to send messages and how to encrypt those communications to avoid detection.").
48. Walker, supra note 36, at 636.
49. Kohlmann, supra note 46.
50. Id.
51. Lawrence Wright, The Terror Web: Were the Madrid Bombings Part of a New, Far-
Reaching Jihad Being Plotted on the Internet?, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 2004, at 40; see
also ECONOMIST, supra note 36 ("Jihadi websites constantly come and go, sometimes taken
down by service providers only to reappear elsewhere, sometimes shifted deliberately to stay
ahead of investigators.").
52. Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusions of Terrorism Insurance, 93
GEO. L.J. 783, 796 (2005) (quoting Barton Gellman, Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared,
WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at A1).
53. See Boardman, supra note 52, at 797 ("[T]errorists can target the Internet itself,
thereby disrupting or destroying the free flow of data, leading to potentially large economic
loss."); see also Brenner & Goodman, supra note 23, at 3 l(describing a "real-life example" in
which "an Australian man hacked into a computerized waste management system... and
Icaused millions of litres of raw sewage to spill out into local parks, rivers and even the
grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel"') (quoting Tony Smith, Hacker Jailed for Revenge Sewage
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interruptions can have considerable financial consequences for the
targeted networks. For example, "Yahoo!, Amazon.com, and CNN,
among others, were shut down for hours as a result of a denial of
service attack attributed to a fifteen-year old boy that was estimated to
have caused $1.2 billion in damage. 54
There is little doubt that al-Qaeda regularly uses Internet
technology, including e-mail and data encryption, to further its
terrorist operations55 and successfully execute its international plots.
5 6
The Internet holds such an important place in al-Qaeda's structure that
the group specifically trains members on Internet usage. In 2002, CNN
reported that "investigators discovered a house in Pakistan run by al
Qaeda that was devoted solely to training for cyber-warfare and
hacking, according to coalition intelligence officials. One official
described it as a place to study tactics, calling it a 'cyber-academy."'
57
As a U.S. Army War College publication stated, quite bluntly, "al
Qaeda loves the Internet." 58
B. The Government's Response
While the Internet may potentially enable al-Qaeda to spread
its messages and instruct its members in covert and undetected ways, it
does not provide an absolute cloak of secrecy. Technology is a double-
edged sword; it can conceal identities and activities, but it can also
leave "digital trails of evidence." 59 Indeed, "police hunted down the
suspected kidnappers of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl by
Attacks, REGISTER (LONDON), Oct. 31, 2001, available at http:// www.theregister.co.uk/
content/4/22579.html).
54. Brenner & Goodman, supra note 23, at 30.
55. Mary W.S. Wong, Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the United States After
September 11 2001: The USA Patriot Act, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 214, 260 (2002); cf
Daniel Sieberg, Bin Laden Exploits Technology to Suit his Needs, CNN.coM, Sept. 21, 2001,
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/inv.terrorist.search/index.html (noting that while some
analysts contend that Osama bin Laden has not abandoned technology, others believe "bin
Laden has ditched his satellite-linked phones, mobile handsets and Internet access in favor of
'Stone Age' messaging techniques to elude law enforcement").
56. Ulph, supra note 35.
57. Kelli Arena & David Ensor, US. Infrastructure Information Found on al Qaeda
Computers, CNN.COM, June 27, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/06/27/alqaeda.cyber.
threat/index.html.
58. Timothy L. Thomas, Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of "Cyberplanning,"
23 PARAMETERS 112, 112 (2003).
59. Tom Spring, Al Qaeda's Tech Traps: Investigations, Arrests Highlight How
Technology Aids and Weakens Terror Network, PC WORLD, Sept. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 117658-page, 1/article.html.
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tracking e-mail that was designed to be anonymous. 6 ° Moreover, the
frequency of e-mails sent by al-Qaeda, even if encryted, can indicate
an attack is imminent, as was the case with 9/11.6 As a result, the
Internet is an arena, just like physical space, where both terrorists and
sovereigns guarding against terrorists enter to effectuate their own
disparate ends.
In light of al-Qaeda's multifaceted use of the Internet to
communicate and coordinate terrorist activities, as well as the
intelligence that can be gained from the Internet, it is not surprising
that the U.S. intelligence community has taken significant interest in
the Internet. As one commentator noted, "[g]iven indications that Al
Qaeda used the Internet in planning the 9/11 attacks and continues to
use the Internet to spread the word of jihad and to communicate with
its supporters about possible future plans, surveillance of online
activity seems relevant to a police function."
62
The government, however, took time to recognize the Internet
as a critical instrument for Muslim extremists. For example, on May 8,
2002, then Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert S.
Mueller testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that, "[a]s best
we can determine, the actual hijackers had no computers, no laptops,
no storage media of any kind.",63 As discussed above, one of the
hijackers, Mohammad Atta, had used e-mail and instant messaging to
communicate with an operative prior to the 9/11 attacks. 64 The FBI
may have known of al-Qaeda's reliance on e-mail and instant
messaging a few months later when it had evidence that the alleged
twentieth hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, "had utilised three Hotmail
accounts through his written pleadings in July and August 2002. "65
The implications of the extremists' Internet usage are now clear. A
declassified summary of a 2006 National Intelligence Estimate noted
that the radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely,
and more anonymously in the Internet age, and that such groups "will
60. Id.
61. See ADL REPORT, supra note 23, at 5 ("Messages were discovered on Al-Qaeda
computers after September 11 th, by federal officials. The first relevant messages were dated
May 2001 and the last were sent on September 9th, two days before the attack. The frequency
of the messages was highest in August 2001. Even when messages sent by Islamist terrorists
are encrypted, their increased frequency serves as a warning sign and a signal indicating that
further investigation is necessary.").
62. Horn, supra note 2, at 758 n.128.
63. Reforming the FBI in the 21st Century: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 248, 254 (2002) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
64. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 248.
65. Walker, supra note 36, at 636.
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increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit,
train, and obtain logistical and financial support."
66
Because it knows key al-Qaeda individuals took advantage of
the Internet to plan the 9/11 attacks, the government has a national
security interest in "monitoring and intercept[ing] communications in
the electronic arena."67 The government has consequently undertaken
68steps to counter al-Qaeda's online presence. The Department of
Homeland Security created an office that is specifically responsible for
"coordinat[ing] defense against and responses to cyber attacks across
the nation."
69
In addition, the government uses several electronic surveillance
programs to monitor al-Qaeda's Internet use. The government
reportedly uses Carnivore, a "computer program [that] can read a
suspect's e-mail and other electronic data on a real-time basis and
print, or store the information for FBI agents to view or save as
electronic evidence for prosecution." 70 The government also uses
Echelon, a "global eavesdropping system" 7' that "links
supercomputers throughout the world to 'automatically search through
the millions of intercepted messages for ones containing pre-
programmed keywords or fax, telex and e-mail addresses."'' 72 Echelon
allegedly "played a key role in the capture of the alleged September 11
mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed ....", The FBI reportedly
also uses Key Logger Systems (KLS), which are "devices or software
programs [that] are installed on a target computer and make a record of
66. Press Release, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Declassified Key Judgments of the
National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United
States" (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.dni.gov/pressreleases/DeclassifiedNIEKey_
Judgments.pdf.
67. Murphy, supra note 4, at 1318.
68. See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big
Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 636 (2003) ("[T]errorists groups such as AI-Qaeda
were known to favor the latest Internet technologies to communicate with each other, which
meant that updating the Internet surveillance laws could assist law enforcement in terrorism-
related cases."); Boardman, supra note 52, at 796.
69. United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, http://www.us-cert.gov.
70. John Lewis, Carnivore-The FBI's Internet Surveillance System: Is it a Rampaging
E-Mailasaurus Rex Devouring Your Constitutional Rights?, 23 WHITIER L. REV. 317, 318
(2001).
71. Kevin J. Lawner, Post-Sept.llth International Surveillance Activity-A Failure of
Intelligence: The Echelon Interception System & The Fundamental Right to Privacy in
Europe, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 435, 452 (2002).
72. Id. at 453 (quoting NicKEY HAGER, SECRET POWER 29 (1996)).
73. Oliver Burkeman & Zaffar Abbas, How Mobile Phones and an £18m Bribe Trapped
9/11 Mastermind, GUARDIAN, Mar. 11, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/
story/0, 12469,911860,00.html.
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every keystroke entered while the computer is running." 74 Magic
Lantern, a KLS program developed by the FBI, "is a Trojan horse
computer virus that can be inadvertently activated by the target
opening an email attachment or by being coaxed into visiting a
predetermined website configured to release the virus." 75
In sum, there is little doubt that al-Qaeda used the Internet and
similar technology to plan and coordinate 9/11 as well as other
terrorist efforts, and that al-Qaeda continues to utilize the Internet to
further its goal to harm the United States and its interests. 76 Therefore,
the U.S. intelligence community has implemented programs to monitor
the Internet for evidence of terrorist planning and to protect against an
attack on the infrastructure of the Internet itself. The question that will
be explored in the next section is whether these facts-both the
terrorists' use of the Internet and the government's efforts to track the
Internet for information on terrorist activity-have resulted in
Muslims-Americans altering their Internet use.
IV. SURVEY OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS
A. Methodology
The following presents the methodological details for a survey
of United States residents who identify themselves as Muslim-
American conducted in May, June, and July of 2007 by OUPOLL.77
The survey attempts to gauge any changes in Internet use among
Muslim-American respondents since the events of 9/11.
The survey was conducted solely by telephone. 78 Interviewers
were provided with scripted introductions and fallback statements
designed to help them gain the cooperation of respondents.79 The
74. Nance, supra note 23, at 768.
75. Id. at 770.
76. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 35, at 379 (noting, in 2005, that "there are now more
than four thousand terrorist Web sites").
77. This survey would not have been possible without the tireless efforts of Dr. Mary
Outwater, the principal investigator of the survey. This section is adapted from a report
provided by Dr. Outwater on July 6, 2007 (on file with author).
78. Each interviewer underwent a project briefing before making any calls. The
questionnaire in its entirety was reviewed and all aspects of the survey were discussed during
this training session. Interviewers then reviewed the questionnaire multiple times individually
before making any calls.
79. The scripted introductions and fallback statements are available online. Survey
Questionnaire, DISCRIMINATION & NATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE, http://www.dnsi.org/
research/intemet/appendices.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).
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questionnaire consisted of fifteen questions, and it can be located
online.8 °
The study targeted a sample of 2,800 telephone numbers
purchased from Survey Sampling, Inc. OUPOLL interviewers made
13,368 call attempts to complete the interview process.
81
Three hundred and eight complete interviews and three
partially complete interviews were conducted. 2 These 311 interviews
represent a margin of error of plus or minus 5.6% at a 95% confidence
level. A 95% confidence level means that if the survey were conducted
one hundred times with one hundred different random samples, the
actual obtained results would fall within the limits of error at least
ninety-five times.
B. Survey Results
Identity: Of the 311 respondents, all identified themselves as
Muslims.83
General Internet Usage: A vast majority of respondents
(80.1%) used the Internet prior to 9/11, while the rest did not. After
9/11, the Internet usage of the respondents increased 7.7%, with 87.8%
stating that they have used the Internet after the terrorist attacks, while
only 11.9% reporting that they have not. The trend towards greater
Internet usage continued, as 90.4% of respondents note that they
"currently use" the Internet, and only 9.3% state that they do not.
Views Regarding Government Surveillance: 71.7% of
respondents believe (48.9% strongly, 22.8% somewhat) that the
government is currently monitoring the activities of Muslims in the
United States. By contrast, only 4.2% (1.6% somewhat and 2.6%
strongly) disbelieve that such monitoring is taking place. Similarly,
70.7% of respondents believe (45.0% strongly, 25.7% somewhat) that
80. Appendices, DISCRIMINATION & NATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE,
http://www.dnsi.org/research/intemet/questionnaire.html (last visited on Nov. 2007).
81. In processing the sample for this study, twelve dialing attempts were allowed to
reach eligible households to complete interviews. If a respondent wished to be called back at a
specific time, interviewers entered an appointment time into the computer and, at the specified
time, the callback would automatically be sent to an interviewer to be called. Survey Results,
DISCRIMINATION & NATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE, http://www.dnsi.org/research/intemet/
surveyresults.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).
82. "Partially completed interviews" are those that were cut off before the end of the
interview, for various reasons, but we were still able to obtain responses to a portion of the
substantive questions.
83. The complete survey results are available, in table format, at Survey Results,
DISCRIMINATION & NATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE, http://www.dnsi.org/research/intemet/
surveyresultshtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).
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the government is currently monitoring the Internet activities of
Muslims in the United States. Only 4.8% disbelieve (2.9% somewhat,
1.9% strongly) that such monitoring is taking place.
Alterations in Behavior--Generally: 86.8% of respondents said
they have not changed at all their general activities after 9/11 due to a
concern that the government may be monitoring their activities. Only
11.6% of respondents changed their general activities (6.1% made
slight changes, 2.3% made moderate changes, 1.6% made many
changes, 1.6% made significant changes) due to this concern.
65.9% of respondents stated that they were not personally
aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any
way, their general activities after 9/11, because of a concern that the
government may be monitoring their activities. 25.4% of respondents
stated they were personally aware of any other Muslims in the United
States who changed, in any way, their general activities after 9/11,
because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their
activities.
Alterations in Behavior-Internet Usage: 89.1% of respondents
said they have not changed their Internet usage at all-the sites they
visit or the amount of time they spend on the Internet-after 9/11 due
to a concern that the government may be monitoring their activities.
Only 8.4% of respondents changed their Internet usage (3.9% made
slight changes, 1.6% made moderate changes, 1.9% made many
changes, 1.0% made significant changes) due to this concern. Of those
who stated that they have made changes in their Internet usage, 57.6%
noted that they did not visit websites after 9/11, because of a concern
that the government may be monitoring their online activities.
77.2% of respondents stated that they were not personally
aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any
way, their Internet usage after 9/11, because of a concern that the
government may be monitoring their activities. 11.9% of respondents
stated they were personally aware of any other Muslims in the United
States who changed, in any way, their Internet usage after 9/11,
because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their
activities. Of these respondents, 45.6% stated that they are personally
aware of other Muslim-Americans who have not visited certain web
sites after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be
monitoring their online activities.
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V. CONCLUSION
The survey indicates that Muslim-Americans overwhelmingly
believe that since 9/11 the U.S. government has monitored their
general and online activities. The government has a clear interest in
tracking the behavior, online and otherwise, of terrorists. It appears,
though, that Muslim-Americans believe that the post-9/11 government
surveillance measures reach not only suspected terrorists, but also
ordinary Muslims in the United States; the net cast by the electronic
monitoring is, in other words, over inclusive.
The percentage of Muslim-Americans that have altered their
use of the Internet, however, is modest when compared to the
percentage of those who believe they are under the government's
watchful eye. What accounts for the difference between the belief that
the government is monitoring the Internet activities of Muslim-
Americans and resultant changes in online behavior is unclear and
must be addressed in another forum; it would be mere speculation at
this point to provide possible reasons for this gulf.
Nonetheless, the survey results demonstrate that there is a
segment of the Muslim-American population that has modified its
Internet usage to avoid the government's intelligence programs. This
begs the question: how else have Muslim-Americans changed the
quality of their lives because of a concern that they may be swept up as
part of the government's search for terrorists and terrorist-related
intelligence? This also needs to be further explored.
There are measures to ensure that such human consequences do
not occur and that the concern underlying those urges to alter one's life
are minimized, if not eliminated. Perhaps the most important of these
is to develop stronger ties between federal agencies and the Muslim-
American community, allowing agencies to assure the Muslim-
American community of its interest in terrorists, not Muslims, and to
cultivate a culture of trust, mutual cooperation, and appreciation.
84
Finally, senior members of the U.S. government should sever
the harmful association between the Muslim religion and terrorism to
help convince Muslim-Americans that Muslims are not categorically
suspect or considered part of monitoring programs solely because of
their religion. In this respect, American leadership may want to borrow
84. A stronger relationship between the federal agencies and the Muslim-American
community would not only help to reduce the human consequences of the post-9/l 1
environment in America, but would also aid the United States in its intelligence gathering
efforts, as tips from moderate Muslims may help expose more radical and extremist
individuals.
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a poignant statement from Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a
Sikh, who said after the July 7, 2005, bombings in London: "I do
believe that terrorism has no religion, terrorists have no religion and
that they are a friend of no religion. No religion in the world preaches
atrocities against innocent men, women and children. ,85
85. Press Briefing, Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Great Britain and Manmohan Singh,
Prime Minister of India (Sept. 8, 2005), available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/
output/Page8152.asp. Dr. Singh also said more recently, after the failed terrorist plots in
London and Glasgow, "A terrorist is a terrorist and has no religion or community." Emily
Wax, Indian Doctors Fear Bomb Plot Backlash, WASH. POST, July 6, 2007, at A10.
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